Graduate Reading List

I. Agency, Structure, and Cognition in Political Analysis

II. Approaches to the Study of Congress and Policy Making

III. Parties and Policy Decision Making

IV. Legislative Processes and Behavior

V. Leadership

VI. Separation of Powers

VII. President and the Electorate

VIII. President and Congress in Legislative Process

IX. President and Congress in Administrative Process

X. President, Congress, Courts

XI. Electoral Linkages

XII. Institutional Development

XIII. Congressional Reform

XIV. National Politics, the Media, and Public Trust

XV. Parliamentary Government

XVI. Federalism and State Legislatures

XVI. Measurement Strategies and Issues

I. Agency, Structure, and Cognition In Political Analysis

A. Books

1. Jeffrey Friedman, ed, The Rational Choice Controversy

2. Michael Thompson, et al., Cultural Theory

3. Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Boncheck, eds., Analyzing Politics:Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions.

4. Arthur Lupia et al, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in
Political Psychology in Political Psychology.

5. Richard Lau and David Sears,eds., Political Cognition.

6. Mark Lichbach, The Cooperator’s Dilemma.

7. Paul Diesing, How Does Social Science Work?: Reflections on Practice (1991).

8. Bryan Jones, Reconceiving Decision Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (1994).

9. , Politics and the Architecture of Choice (2001).

10. James March. A Primer on Decision Making. New York, NY: Free Press (1994)
11. Roger W. Cobb and Marc Howard Ross,eds. Cultural Strategies of Agenda
Denial : Avoidance, Attack, and Redefinition (1997)..

12. David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, eds. The Politics of Problem
Definition : Shaping the Policy Agenda (1994).

13. Roger W. Cobb and Charles D.Elder. Participation in American Politics : The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (1983).

14. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (1992).

15. Jack Knight and Itai Snead, eds., Explaining Social Institutions (1995).

16. Julia Adams, Elizabeth Clemens, and Shola Orloff, eds. Remaking
Modernity (2005).

17. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions,and Social Analysis
(2004).

B. Articles and Papers: Rational Choice Orientations to Context, Change, and Ideas Culture

1. Barry Weingast, ed., Rational Choice Perspectives on Institutions, in Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (1996).

2. Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, American Political Science Review 92: 1-22 (1998).

3. Thomas Saalfeld, Rational Choice Theory in Legislative Studies: Models of Politics Without Romanticism Journal of Legislative Studies 1:32-65 (1995).

4. Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, A Grammar of Institutions, American Political Science Review 89:582-601 (1995).

5. Dorothea Kuber, “On the Regulation of Social Norms”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17: 4449-477 (2001).

6 .Symposium on the Future of Political Science, PS 35:181-207(2002).

7. William, Riker 1977. “The Future of a Science of Politics”.American
Behavioral Scientist 21:11-37.

8. Kenneth Shepsle. 1986. “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium
Institutions”. In Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Herbert
Weisberg. New York, NY: Agathon Press.
9. Oliver Williamson, 1999. “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A
Transactions Cost Economics Perspective”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 306-343 (1999). See comment as well.

10. Peter Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, “More Order Without Laws: A theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10: 390-407 (1994).

11. Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, “Norms, Third-Party Sanctions and Cooperation”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 33-65
(1990).

12. Jonathan Bendor et al, Recycling the Garbage Can: An assessment of a
Research Program, American Political Science Review 95:169-191(2001).

13. Johan Olsen, Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of
Politics, American Political Science Review 95:191-199 (2001).

14. Terry Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-255 (Special Issue, (1990).

15.————–, “Politics and the Theory of Organization”, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 7: 106-130 (Special Issue, (1991).

B. Structure, Ideas, and Sequence

1. Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation American Political Science Review 81: 3-21 (1987).

2. Larry Dodd, Political Learning and Political Change: Understanding Development Across Time, in Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., The Dynamics of American Politics.

3. Paul Quirk, Structure and Performance: An Evaluation, in Roger Davidson, ed., The Postreform Congress.

4. ———-, In Defense of the Politics of Ideas, Journal of Politics 50: 31-41(1988).

5. ———-, Deregulation and the Politics of Ideas, in Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest.

6. Herbert Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
Political Science, American Political Science Review 79: 293-304 (1985).

7. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, American Political Science Review 94: 252-269 (2000).

8. Jon Elster, Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition, American Political Science Review 94:685-696 (2000).

9. Herbert Simon, Public Administration in Todays World of Organizations and Markets, PS 23:749-747 (2000).

10. Sidney Tarrow, Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, American Political Science Review 90:389-397 (1996).

11. Ian Lustick, History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias. American Political Science Review 90: 605-619 (1996).

12. Robert Jervis, “ Complexity and the Analysis of Political and Social Life”, Political Science Quarterly 112: 569-595 (Winter, 1997-19. John Schiemann, “Meeting Halfway Between Rochester and Frankfurt: Generative Salience, Focal Points, and Strategic Interaction”, American Journal of Political Science 44:1-17(2000).

13. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies 19: 936-957 (1996).

14 .Paul Pierson, “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutions, Origins, and Change”, Governance 13:475-499 (2000).

15. Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford Jones, Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science, American Journal of Political Science 41: 1414-1461 (1997).
98).

16. Albert S. Yee, “Thick Rationality and the Missing “Brute Fact”:
The Limits Of Rationalist Incorporations Of Norms and Ideas”, Journal of Politics 59: 1001-1048 (1997).

17. Mark Blyth, “The Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic Ideas, Distributional Conflict and Institutional Change” World Politics 54 (1) October 2001.

18. —————-, “The Political Power of Financial Ideas:
Transparency, Risk and Distribution in Global Finance” in Jonathan
Kirshner (ed.) Monetary Orders (2002)

19.——————, Of Ontologies and Elastoplasts: What the Study of Institutions and Ideas tells us about ‘Doing’ Political Science, in Dave Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science (2002)

20. Robert Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order:
Explaining Political Change”, American Political Science Review 96:697- 712 (2002).

21. Lisa Weeden, Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science, American Political Science Review 96:697-712 (2002).

22. Tim Buhte, “Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence”, American Political Science Review 96:481-495 (2002).

23. Arash Abizadeh, ‘ Does Liberal Democracy Presupppose a CuItural Nation”, American Political Science Review 96:495-509 (2002).

24. Ira Katznelson. The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy:
Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference. American Political Science Review 92: 191-198 (1998).

25. James Mahoney, Retinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change, Studies in Comparative International Development 34:3-32, Summer, 1999.
C. Cognitive Orientations to Institutions, Politics, Change

1. Howard Lavine, The Electoral Consequences of Ambivalence Toward Presidential Candidates, American Journal of Political Science 45: 915-930 (2001)—See Bibliog.—Converse et al

2. Richard Lau and David Redlawsk, Using Conitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, American Journal of Political Science 45: 951-971
(2001)

3. Diana Richards, “ Coordination and Shared Mental Images”, American Journal of Political Science 45:259-277 (2000).

4. James Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17: 62-83 (2001).

5..————————–, “On the limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame”, Journal of Politics 63:1041-1067 (2001).

6. Thomas Nelson and Zoe Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion, Journal of Politics 61: 1040-1068 (1999).

7. Edmund Kitch, “ The Framing Hypothesis: Is it supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surchrage on a Cash Price”, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 6: 217-235 (1990).

II. Approaches to the Study of Congress and Policy Making

A. Books

1. Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government.

2. Charles Lindblom. The Intelligence of Democracy.

3. Gary Gregg, Presidential Republic

4. Arthur Maass. Congress and the Common Good.

5. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action.

6. Samuel Beer, To Make A Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism.

7. David Mayhew, America’s Congress.

8. Charles Stewart, Analyzing Congress

9. David Truman, The Governmental Process

10. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States

11. Herbert Storing,ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics

12. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government and the Semi-Sovereign Public

13. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy

14. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism. See also article in APSR,
Vol.61, pp. 5-24 , March, 1967.

15. Frank Baumgardner and Beth Leech, Basic Interests (Study of Interest Group Scholarship)

16. Kay Schlosman and John Tierney, Organized Interests and American
Democracy.

17. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign Public.

18. Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy.

19. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in The United States.

20. Barry Burden, ed., Uncertainty in American Politics
21. David Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (1984).

B. Articles and Papers

1. Joseph Cooper, Congress in Organizational Perspective, in Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Revisited, pp.140-163, 1st Edition (!977).

2. ————, Organization and Innovation in the House of
Representatives, in Joseph Cooper and G. Calvin MacKenzie, eds.,
The House At Work, pp. 319-55 (1981).

3. Lee Emory G., Representation, Virtue, and Jealousy in the Brutus-Publius Dialogue, Journal of Politics 59:1073-1096 (1997).

4. 12. Michael Cobb and James Kuklinski, Changing Minds: Political Argument and Political Persuasion, American Journal of Political Science 41: 88-122 ( 1997).

5. Evan Charney, Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere, American Political Science Review 92: 97-110 (1998).

6. Edward Lascher,Jr., Assessing Legislative Deliberation: A Preface to Empirical Analysis, Legislative Studies Quarterly 21: 501-521 (!996).

7. James Kuklinsky and Gary Segura, Endogeneity, Exogeneity, Time, and Space in Political Representation, Legislative Studies Quarterly 20: 3-23 (1995).

8. David Weaver, “ Leadership, Locke, and the Federalist”, American Journal of Political Science 41: 402-420 (1997).

9. Robert Morgan, “Madison’s Analysis of the Sources of Political Authority”, American Political Science Review 75: 613-625(1981).

10. Robert Goodwin,”Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Gridlock and Beyond”, American Political Science Review 90: 331- 344(1996).

11. Thomas Smith, Aristotle on the Conditions and Limits of the Common Good”, American Political Science Review 93:625-
637(1999).

12. John Aldrich, Power and Order in Congress, in Morris Fiorina and
David Rohde, eds., Home Style and Washington Work (1989).

13. John Aldrich and Kenneth Shepsle, Explaining Institutional Change: Soaking ,Poking, and Modeling in the U.S. Congress. In William
Bianco,ed. Congress on Display, Congress at Work (2000).

` 14. Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics, American PoliticalScience Review , Vol.46, pp.376-97, June, 1952.

15. Jeffrey Berry, Interest Group Society and Interest Groups and
Gridlock in Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis, eds., Interest Group
Politics, 6th Edition, Chapter 16.

16. Charles Lindblom, Another State of Mind, APSR 76: 9-21(March, 1982)

17. John Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis, APSR 77:368-383 (June
1983). See also Lindblom and Dahl responses, pp. 384-389.

18. Mark Warren, Deliberative Democracy and Authority, American Political Science Review 90: 46-61 (1996).

19. Bryan Jones et al. “Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions”, American Political Science Review 97:151-171 (2003).

20. James Stimson, et al, Dynamic Representation, American Political Science Review 89: 543-566 (1995).

21. Douglas Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers, in Trevor Colbourn,ed., Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglas Adair, 1974.

III. Parties and Policy Decision Making

A. Books

1. Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.

2. John Aldrich, Why Parties.

3. Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics.

4. Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew.

5. Sarah Binder, Minority Rights/Majority Rule. (See also APSR, 90: 8-21,1996).

6. David Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.

7. John Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 3rd Edition.

8. Nicole Rae and Colton Campbell, eds., New Majority or Old Minority: The Impact of Republicans on Congress.

9. John Bader, Taking Initiative: Leadership Agendas in Congress and A The Contract with America@.

10. Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism (2001).

11. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It (2000).

12. Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk.. The Politics of Deregulation (1985).
13. Diana Evans, Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build
Majority Coalitions in Congress.
B. Articles and Papers: General

1. Joseph Cooper and Garry Young, Partisanship, Bipartisanship, and Crosspartisanship@, in Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 6th Edition, pp. 246-274 (1997).

2.————— and Rick Wilson, The Role of Congressional Parties, in Joel Silbey, ed., The Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, pp. 899-930 (1994).

3.—————- and Garry Young. 2002. Party and Preference in
Congressional Decision Making: Roll Call Voting in the House of
Representatives, 1889-1999. In Party, Process, and Political Change in
Congress, ed. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

4. Diana Evans, Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork-Barrel Projects to
Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives, American
Journal of Political Science 38:894-917(1994)

5. M.V. Hood and Irwin Morris, Boll Weevils and Roll Call Voting: A Study in Time and Space, Legislative StudiesQuarterly 23: 245-271 (1998).

6. David Brady, et al., The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968, Legislative Studies Quarterly 4: 381- 409 (1979).

7. Gregory Hager and Jeffrey Talbert, Look for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 75-101(2000).

8. Patrick Cronin and Benjamin Fordham, Timeless Principle or Today’s Fashion: Testing the Stability of the Linkage Between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate, Journal of Politics 61: 967-999 (1999).

9. Thomas Casey and Barry Rundquist, Party and Committee in Distributive Politics, Journal of Politics 61:1156-1170 (1999).

10. Roy B. Fleming, et al, Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas, Journal of Politics 61: 76-109 (1999).

11. Mary Nye, Conservative Coalition Support in the House of Representatives, 1963-1988″, Legislative Studies Quarterly 18: 255-271 (1993).

12. Bryan Jones, et al, Does Incrementalism Stem from Political Consensus or Institutional Gridlock, American Journal of Political Science 41: 1319-1340 (1997).

13. Thomas Stratmann, Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints. American Political Science Review 94: 665-677 (2000).

14. Amihai Glazer et al, A Strategic Vote Delay in the U.S. House of Representatives, Legislative Studies Quarterly 20: 37-47 (1995).

15. David Soherr-Hadwiger, Military Construction Policy: A Test of Competing Explanations of Universalism in Congress, 23 Legislative Studies Quarterly, 57-79 (1998).

16. Howard Reiter, The Building of a Bifactional Structure: The Democrats in the 1940’s, Political Science Quarterly 116: 107-131 (2001).

17. Melissa Collie, Universalism and Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives,1921-1980″, American Journal of Political Science 32: 865-884 (1988).

18. Melissa Collie, The Rise of Coalition Politics: Voting in the U.S. House,1933-1980, Legislative Studies Quarterly 13:321-343 (1988).

19. Melissa Collie, The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective, Legislative Studies Quarterly 13:427-459 (1988).

20. Melissa Collie, Electoral Patterns and Voting Alignments in the U.S. House, 1886-1886, Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:107-129 (1989).

21.———- and David Brady, The Decline of Partisan Voting Coalitions in the House of Representatives, in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (1985).

22. Barry Rundquist et al, The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence, Legislative Studies Quarterly 21:265-283 (1996).

23. Brinck Kerr, Party Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1877-1990: An Assessment of Long and Short Term Effects”, Congress & The Presidency 27:189-206 (2000).

24. R. Shep Melnick, “Governing More and Enjoying It Less”, in Morton Keller and R. Shep Melnick, eds., Taking Stock: American Government in the 20th Century (1999).

25. David Brady et al, Does Party Matter: An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in Three Institutional Contexts, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 18:140-155 (2002).

26. Garry Young and Val Heitshusen, Party and the Dynamics of Congressional Committee Composition, British Journal of Political Science (2002).

27. Timothy Nokken, Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Voting and Role Call Behavior, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:417-444(2000).

28. John Wilkerson, Killer Amendments’ in Congress, American
Political Science Review 93: 535-553(1999).

29. Sinclair Barbara. 2002. “Do Parties Matter”. In Party, Process, and
Political Change in Congress, ed. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

30. Cox Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. “On the Decline of Party
Voting in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly 16: 547-570.

31. Ansolabehere Stephen, James Snyder, and Charles Stewart. 2001.
“The Effects of Party and Preference on Congressional Roll-Call Voting”. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26:533-573.

32. David King and Richard Zeckhauser,2003. “Congressional Vote Options”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 28:387-413.

33. Rick Wilson and Patricia Hurley, Partisan Voting Patterns in the U.S. Senate, 1877-1986, Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:225-251 (1989).

34. R. Lawrence Butler, 2003. Assessing Party Strength in the House of
Representatives. In John Greene and Rick Farmer, eds., The State of the Parties, 4th Edition.

35. Samuel Patterson and Gregory Caldiera, Party Voting in the U.S. Congress,
British Journal of Political Science 18: 111-131(1988).

36. Gregory Bovitz, 2002. “Electoral Consequences of Porkbusting in the U.S. House of Representatives”, Political Science Quarterly 117: 455-479 (2003).

37. Jason Roberts and Stven Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Contexts, and Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. 1971-2000”, American Journal of Political Science 47:305-318 (2003).

38. Jeffrey Jenkins and Michael Munger, “ Investigating the Incidence of Killer
Amendments in Congress”, Journal of Politics 65: 498-518 (May, 2003).

39. Mark Smith, “The Nature of Party Governance: Connecting Conceptualization and Measurement”, American Journal of Political Science 41:1042-57 (1997).

40. J. Mark Wrighton and Geoffrey Peterson, “A Test for Ideological Bias in House Subcommittee, 1979-2000”, Congress & the Presidency, 30: 139-152 (2003).

41. Jeffrey Jenkins, Eric Schickler, and Jamie Carson, “Constituency Cleavages and Congressional Parties: Measuring Homogeneity and Polarization,1857-1913”, 28 Social Science History, pp. 537-573, Winter, 2004.

42. William Lowry and Charles Shipan, Party Differentiation in Congress, Legislative Studies Quarterly 27:33-61 (2002).

C. Articles and Papers: Rational Choice

1. John Aldrich and David Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule, Political Science Quarterly 112: 541-567 (1997-98).

2. Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House, Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 215-231(1994).

3. Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party, British Journal of Political Science 23:235-66 (1993).

4. ——————–, A Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12:234-257 (1996).

5.——————–, Paradoxes of Parties in Congress, Legislative
Studies Quarterly 24: 31 65 (1999).

6. ——————-, The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond, Journal of Politics 61:832-841(1999).

7. , Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship@, American Journal of Political Science 44: 212-228 (2000).

8.——— and Alan Wiseman. 2001. Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26: 357-391.

9. ——— and Adam Meirowitz. 2002. “Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit”. Legislative
Studies Quarterly 27:191-219.

10. Sarah Binder et al, Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party, Journal of Politics 61:815-831(1999).

11. Eric Schickler and Andrew Rich, Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House@, American Journal of Political Science 41: 1340-1375 (1997).

12. —————————-. Party Government in the House Reconsidered: A Response to Cox and McCubbins, American Journal of Political Science 41: 1387-94 (1997).

13. Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Toward a Theory of
Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich’s Evidence, American Journal of Political Science 41:1376-86 (1997).

14.

15. James Snyder and Tim Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence on Roll-Call Voting American Journal of Political Science 44:193- 212 (2000).

16. Steven Smith, Positive Theories of Congressional Parties, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 193-217 (2000).

17. David Rohde, Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements, Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 341-361 (1994).

18. Eric Schickler. 2000. Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998: A Test of Partisan and Ideological Balance Models. American Political Science Review 94: 269-289.

19. Jeffrey Banks, Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures@, American Political Science Review 94: 677-683 (2000).

20. Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan, A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,
American Political Science Review 94:73-89 (2000).

21. Tim Groseclose and James Snyder, “Buying Supermajorities”,
American Political Science Review 90: 303-316 (1996).

22. Tim Groseclose and James Snyder, Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions. American Political Science Review 94: 683- 685 (2000).

23. Richard Forgette and Brian Sala, Conditional Party Government and Member Turnout on Recorded Votes, Journal of Politics 61:467-484 (1999).

24. Jeffrey Jenkins, Examining the Bonding Effects of Party: A Comparative Analysis of Roll Call Voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses@. American Journal of Political Science 43:1144-1165 (1999).

25 ——————-, Examining the Robustness of Ideological Voting: Evidence from the Confederate Congress@. American Journal of Political Science 44: 811-822 (2000.

26. Kathleen Bawn, Constructing US: Ideology, Coalition Politics and False Consciousness. American Journal of Political Science 43: 303-334 (1999).

27. Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan, A The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal- Agent Slack in Political Institutions@. Journal of Law and Economics: 33: 103-131 (1990).

28. Clifford Carruba and Craig Volden, Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions. American Journal of Political Science 44:261-278 (2000).

29. John Boyce and Diane Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 18: 1-39 (2002).

30. Nolan McCarty et al, The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress, American
Political Science Review 95:673-689 (2001).

31. Eyal Baharad and Shumel Nitzan, “ Ameliorating Majority
Decisiveness Through Expression of Preference Intensity”, American
Political Science Review 96:745-755 (2002).

32. Michael Hiscox, “ Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation”, American Political Science Review 96:593-608 (2002).

33. Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. “Agenda Power in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1877-1986”. In Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, ed. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.

34. David Epstein, “Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 14:183-204 (1998).

IV. Legislative Processes and Behavior

A. Books

1. Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking.

2.—————-, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmakers: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era.

3.—————-, The Transformation of the United States Senate.

4. Christopher Deering and Steven Smith, Committees in Congress, 3rd edition ( 1997).

5. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics.

6. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organizations (1991)..

7. Fred Harris, Deadlock or Decision: The U.S. Senate and the Rise of National Politics

8. Burdette Loomis, The Contemporary Congress, 3nd Edition

9. Forrest Maltzman, Competing Principals.

10. David Whiteman, Communication in Congress.

11. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, eds, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.

12. Richard Hall, Participation in Congress (1996).

13. David King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction. (See also APSR, 88:48-62, 1994).

14. Randall Strahan, New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee.

15. Jeffrey Worsham, Other People’s Money: Policy Change, Congress, and Bank Regulation.

16. Steven Smith, Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate (1989).

17. Walter Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 5th Edition (2001).

18. Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate.

19. Stephen Van Beek, Post-Passage Politics: Bicameral Resolution in Congress (1995).

20. Bruce Oppenheimer, ed., Senate Exceptionalism.

21. Glen Krutz, Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress

22.

B. Articles and Papers: General

1. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach, American Journal of Political Science 41:895-919(1997).

2. Richard Forgette, Reed’s Rules and the Partisan Theory of Legislative Organization, Polity 29:375-96(1997).

3. Melissa Collie and Joseph Cooper, Multiple Referral and the New Committee System in the House of Representatives, in Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, pp.245-272, 4th Edition (1989).

4. Steven Smith and Marcus Flathman, Managing the Senate Floor: Complex Unanimous Consent Agreements Since the 1950’s, Legislative
Studies Quarterly 14: 349-74 (1989).

5. C. Lawrence Evans, A Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 605-643 (1999).

6. Barbara Romzek and Jennifer Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff:Political Professionals or Clerks?, American Journal of Political Science 41: 1251-1279 (1997).

7. Sarah Binder and Steven Smith, Acquired Procedural Tendencies
and Congressional Reform, in J. Thurber and R. Davidson, eds,
Remaking Congress: Change and Stability in the 1990’s, pp. 53-73.

8.——————————————, Political Goals and Procedural Choice in the Senate, Journal of Politics 60: 398-417 (1998).

9. Frank Baumgartner, et al, The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions, The Journal of Politics 62: 321-350 (2000).

10. Susan Hammond, Recent Research on Legislative Staffs, Legislative Studies Quarterly 21: 543-577 (1996).

11. Shirley Geiger, The House Appropriations Committee, FY 1963-1982: A Micro-Budgetary Perspective, Legislative Studies Quarterly 19:397-417 (1994).

12. John Hardin, Advocacy versus Certainty: The Dynamics of Committee Jurisdiction Concentration, Journal of Politics 60: 374-398, 1998.

13. Tim Groseclose and Charles Stewart III, The Value of Committee Seats in the House:, 1947-91, American Journal of Political Science 42:453-475 (1998).

14. Richard Hall and Bernard Grofman, The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias, American Political Science Review 84:1149-1167 (1990).

15. Thomas Broden, Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, Notre Dame Lawyer 33:209-238 ( March, 1958).

16. Thomas Remington and Steven Smith, Theories of Legislative Institutions and the Russian Duma, American Journal of Political Science 42:545-573 (1998).

17. Lee Hamilton, What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach About Congress, PS 23: 757-766 (2000).

18. Sidney Waldman, A How Congress Does the Difficult, PS 23: 7803-810 (2000).

19. John Aldrich and David Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee, 62 Journal of Politics: 1-34 (2000).

20. Ken Kollman, “ Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees”, American Journal of Political Science 41: 519-545. (1997).

21. Frances Lee, Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics, American Political Science Review 94: 59-73 (2000).

22. John Boyce and Diane Bischak. 2002. “The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress”, Journal of Law, Economics,& Organization 18:1-39.

23. Bryan Marshall, Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House, Legislative Studies Quarterly 27:61-87 (2002).
B. Rational Choice

1. Barry Weingast and William Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress, Journal of Political Economy, 96:132-163 (1988).

2. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach, American Journal of Political Science 41:895-919(1997).

3. Richard Forgette, Reed’s Rules and the Partisan Theory of Legislative Organization, Polity 29:375-96(1997).

4. Douglas Dion and John Huber, Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules, Journal of Politics 58: 25-54(1996).

5.————————-, Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules, American Journal of Political Science 41: 945-958 (1997).

6. Keith Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules Reconsidered, American Journal of Political Science 41: 919-945( 1997).
7.————–, Rejoinder to “Sense and Sensibility”,
American Journal of Political Science 41: 958-965( 1997).

8. David Epstein et al, A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan, American Journal of Political Science 41:965-999 (1997).

9. Gary Cox, On the Effect of Legislative Rules, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 169-193 (2000).

10. Tim Groseclose and Charles Stewart III, The Value of Committee Seats in the House:, 1947-91, American Journal of Political Science 42:453-475 (1998).

11. Richard Hall and Bernard Grofman, The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias, American Political Science Review 84:1149-1167 (1990).

12. John Aldrich and David Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee, 62 Journal of Politics: 1-34 (2000).

13. Daniel Diermeier and Timothy Fedderson, “ Information and
Congressional Hearings”, American Journal of Political Science 44:51- 66 (2000).

14. Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature”, American Journal of Political Science 34:531-564
(1990).

15. ————- —————–. “Specialization Decisions Within Committees”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13:366-387(1997).

16. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, “ Legislative Organization Under
Separation of Powers”. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 17:373-
397(2001).

17. David Baron. 2000. “Legislative Organization with Informational Committees”,
American Journal of Political Science 44: 485-506.

18. D. Diermeier, “Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions”,
American Political Science Review 82: 344-355 (1995).

19. Katherine Bawn, Strategic Responses to Institutional Change: Parties,
Committees, and Multiple Referral, Public Choice 88: 239-258 (1996).

V. Leadership

A. Books

I. Frank Mackaman, ed., Understanding Congressional Leadership.

2. Robert Peabody, Leadership in Congress.

3. Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House.

4. John Barry, The Ambition and the Power: The Fall of Jim Wright.

5. Roger Davidson, Susan Hammond, and Raymond Smock, eds.,
Masters of the House.

6. Richard Baker and Roger Davidson, eds., First Among Equals:
Outstanding Senate Leaders.

7. C. Lawrence Evans, Leadership in Committee: A Comparative Analysis of Leadership Behavior in the U.S. Senate.

8. Frances Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader: A Different Kind Of Senate, 1961-1976. (M.E. Sharpe).

9. Denny Hastert, Speaker: Lessons from Forty Years of Coaching and Politics

10. Lou Dubose and Jan Reid, The Hammer: Tom Delay and the Rise of the
Republican Congress.

B. Articles and Papers

1. Joseph Cooper and David Brady, Institutional Context and
Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn, American Political Science Review 75: 411-425 (1981).

2. David Canon, The Institutionalization of Leadership in the
U.S. Congress, Legislative Studies Quarterly 14: 415-43 (1989).

3. Barbara Sinclair, The Evolution of Party Leadership in the Modern House, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peters, eds., The Atomistic Congress: An
Interpretation of Congressional Change.

4. Donald Baumer, Senate Democratic Leadership in the 101st Congress, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peters,eds., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation of Congressional Change.

5. Daniel Palazzolo, From Dececentalization to Centralization:
Members Changing Expectations for House Leaders, in Roger Davidson, ed., The
Postreform Congress.

6. Roger Davidson, Senate Leaders: Janitors for an Untidy Chamber, in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 3rd Edition.

7. Charles Jones, Joseph Cannon and Howard Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives, Journal of Politics 30: 617-46 (1968).

8. Barbara Sinclair, Transformational Leader or Faithful Agent: Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 421-451(1999).

9——————–, 2000. Republican House Majority Party Leadership in the 104th and 105th Congress. In William Bianco, ed., Congress on Display, Congress at Work, pp. 139-167.

10. Richard Forgette, What We Don’t Know about Congresssional Party Leadership. In William Bianco, ed., Congress on Display, Congress at Work, pp. 101-113.

11. Keith Krehbiel and Alan Wiseman, “Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian From Illinois”. Legislative Studies Quarterly 26: 357-390(2001)

12. Eric Lawrence et al, “The Politics of Speaker Cannon’s Committee Assignments”. American Journal of Political Science 45:563-579 (2001).

13. Richard Waterman and Kenneth Meier, “Principal Agent Models: An Expansion”, American Journal of Political Science 41:885-919 (1997).8: 173-202 (April, 1998).

14. Kathleen Bawn, Congressional Party Leadership: Utilitarian versus Majoritarian Incentives, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23: 219-245 (1998).

15. Randall Strahan and Daniel Palazzolo, The Gingrich Effect, Political Science Quarterly, 119:89-115 (2004).

16. Randall Strahan, “Personal Motives, Constitutional Forms, and the Public Good: Madison on Political Leadership”, in Samuel Kernell, ed., Madison?

16. Ronald Peters, “ Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The Case of Newt Gingrich”, in Nicol Rae and Colton Campbell, eds., New Majority or Old Minority: The Impact of Republicans on Congress, pp. 43-69.

17. Samuel Patterson, “Party Leadership in the U.S. Senate”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14: 393-415 (1989).

18. Bernard Groffman et al, Congressional Leadership, 1965-96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate, Legislative Studies Quarterly 27:87-107 (2002).

19. John E. Owens, “The Return of Party Government in the US House of
Representatives: Central Leadership-Committee Relations in the 104th Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (April, 1997): 247-272.

20. Richard Claus, Principal-Agent Theory and the Power of State House Speakers,
Legislative Studies Quarterly 26:319-339 (2001).

21. C. Lawrence Evans and Walter Oleszek, The Strategic Context of Congresional Party Leadership, Congress & the Presidency 26: 1-20, Spring, 1999.

VI. Separation of Powers

A. Books

1. John Rohr, To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of The Administrative State

2. Charles Jones, Separate But Equal Branches.

3. Alfred De Grazia, Republic in Crisis: Congress Against the Executive Force
(1965).

4. Theodore Lowi, The Personal President, Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled

5. Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation

6. James Caesar, Liberal Democracy and Political Science

7. Samuel Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism

8. W.B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: Origin to the Adoption of Constitution

9. Harvey Mansfield, Taming The Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power

10. Bruce Ackerman, We the People

11. David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress
Abuses the People Through Delegation.

12. Sotirios Barker, The Constitution and the Delegation of Congressional Power

13. Terry Eastland, Energy in the Executive: The Case for the Strong Presidency

14. David Nichols, The Myth of the Modern Presidency

B. Articles: Separation of Powers

1. Donald R. Brand, “ Republicanism and the Vigorous Executive: A Review Essay”, Political Science Quarterly 109: 895-903 (Winter 1994-95)

2. Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast, The American System of Separated Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB, Journal of Law . Economics, and Organization 16:269-306 (2000).

3. Mark Franklin and W.P. Hirczy de Mino, A Separated Powers, Divided Government, and Turnout in U.S. Elections, American Journal of Political Science 42: 316-337 (1998).

4. Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime
Building in American Government”, Political Science Quarterly 113
(Winter 1998-1999): 689-702.

5. Harvey Mansfield, Separation of Powers in the American Constitution, in Harvey Mansfield, America’s Constitutional Soul.

6. Robert Dahl, The Myth of the Presidential Mandate, Political Science Quarterly 105: 355-372 (Fall, 1990).

7. James Q. Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?, Public Interest, Winter, 1987, pp.36-52.

8. Harvey Mansfield, Disguised Liberalism, in The Spirit of Liberalism (anti-Lowi)

9. Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 1: 81 ( Spring, 1985).

10. Walter Mebane, Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional balancing in American Presidential and House elelections, American Political Science Review 94: 37-59 (2000).

11. Hugh Heclo,” What Has Happened to the Separation of Powers?“, Bradford
Wilson and Peter Schramm, eds., Separation of Powers and Good Government,
pp.131-161.

12. Robert Spitzer, “Is the Separation of Powers Obsolete” in Richard Waterman,
The Presidency Reconsidered, pp.169-194.

VII. President and Electoral Process

A. Books

1. George Edwards, Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit

2. Diane Heith, Polling to Govern.

3 Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency

4. Patricia Conley, Presidential Mandates

5. Mel Laracey, The Partisan Story of Going Public

6. Jeffrey Stonecash, et al, Diverging Parties

7. James Campbell, The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections, 2nd Edition.

8. Samuel Kernell, Going Public.

9. Martin Medhurst, ed., Beyond the Rhetorical President.

10. Patricia Conley, Presidential Mandates.
B. Articles and Papers

1. Jack Rakove, “Presidential Selection., Electoral Fallacies”, Political Science Quarterly, 119:21-39 (2004).

2. Judith Best, “Presidential Selection: Complex problems and Simple Solutions, Political Science Quarterly, 119:39-61 (2004).

3. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective”, 59 Public Opinion Quarterly: 163-195( Summer, 1995).

4. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “Presidential Manipulation of Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters”, 110 Political Science Quarterly, Number 4, 1995-96.

5. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: Use of Private Polls in Kennedy’s 1960 Campaign”, 88 APSR: 527-540 (Sept., 1994).

6. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, “Studying Substantive Democracy: Public, Opinions, Institutions, and Policy Making”, 27 PS: 9-16 (March, 1994).

7. Jon Bond et al, “The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress”, Journal of Politics 65:92-111 (2003).

VIII. President and Congress in Legislative Process

A. Books

1. Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena.

2. Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, Second Edition.

3. David Brady and Craig Volden, Resolving Gridlock.

4. David Mayhew, Divided We Govern.

5. Steven Shull and Thomas Shaw, Explaining Congressional Presidential Relations

6.Charles Jones, Clinton and Congress.

7. Sharyn O’Halloran, Politics, Processes, and American Trade Policy.

8. Mark A. Peterson, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill From Eisenhower to Reagan (1990).

9. Robert Spitzer, The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the Presidency.

10. Lance LeLoup and Steven Shull, The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in National Policy Making

11. Charles Cameron, Veto Bargaining

12. John Gilmour, Strategic Disagreement (1995).

13. Judith Michaels, The President’s Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (1997).

14. Kenneth Collier, Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs (1997).

15. Thomas Weko, The Politicizing Presidency: The White House Personnel Office, 1948-1994 (1995).

16. Alfred De Grazia, Republic in Crisis: Congress Against the Executive Force
(1965).

17. Mark Rosell, Executive Privilege: The Dilemma of Secrecy and
Democratic Accountability (1994).

18. Adam Breckenridge, The Executive Privilege: Presidential Control Over
Information (1974).

19. Harold Relyea et al, President and Information Policy (1981).

20. Patricia Ingraham, The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in
American Democracy ( 1995).

21. Andrew Rudalevige, Managing the President’s Program..

22. Robert Gilmour and Alexis Halley, Who Makes Public Policy: The Struggle Between Congress and the Executive.

23. George Edwards, At The Margins.

B. Articles and Papers: President and Congress in Legislative Process
1.George Edwards and B. Dan Wood, Who Influences Whom: The President and the Public Agenda American Political Science Review 93: 327-345 (1995).

2. Joseph Cooper, Assessing Legislative Performance: A Reply to the Critics of Congress, Congress and the Presidency 13: 21-41 (1986).

3. William West and Joseph Cooper, Legislative Influence v. Presidential Dominance, Political Science Quarterly 104: 581-607 (1990).

4. Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins, Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making, Legislative Studies Quarterly 19:361-385 (1994).

5. Terry Sullivan, Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence. American Political Science Review 91: 845-854 (1997).

6. B. Dan Wood, The Federal Balanced Budget Force: Modeling Variation from 1904-1996″, Journal of Politics 62:817-846 (2000).

7. Charles Cameron et al, Testing Formal Theories of Political Rhetoric, Journal of Politics 62:187-206 (2000) Note: Pres. Veto power.

8. Stanley Renshon, After the Fall: The Clinton Presidency in Psychological Perspective, Political Science Quarterly 115: 41-67(2000).

9. Jessica Korn, “The Legislative Veto and the Limits of Public Choice Analysis”, Political Science Quarterly 109: 873-895 (Winter 1994-95).

10. Robert Gilmour, “Central Legislative Clearance: A Revised Perspective”, Public Administration Review, March/April, 1971.

11. Ronald Moe and Steven Teel, “Congress as Policy Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal”, Political Science Quarterly 85: 443-470 (1970).

12. Marc Rozell, “ Executive Privilege in the Clinton Scandal”, in Marc Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Clinton Scandal and the Future of American Government ( 2000).

13. Brandice Canes-Wrone and Scott de Marchi, Presidential Approval and Legislative Success”, Journal of Politics 64: 491-509 (2002).

14. John Gilmour, Individual and Institutional Influences on the
President’s Veto”, Journal of Politics 64: 198-219 (2002).

15. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Legislative Organization Under
Separation of Powers, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17: 373-397
(2001).

16. Nolan McCarthy, Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics, American Political Science Review 94: 117-131 (2000).

17. Ronald Moe and Steven Teel, “Congress as Policy Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal”, Political Science Quarterly 85: 443-470 (1970).

18. Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Presidential Press Conferences Over Time, American Journal of Political Science 47:348-354 (2003).

19. Brandice Canes-Wrone, The President’s Legislative Influence from Public
Appeals”, American Journal of Political Science 45:313-330 (2003).

20. R. Kent Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance”, Journal of Public Policy 371-398 (1986).

21. Richard Powell and Dean Schloyer, “Public Presidential Appeals and
Congressional Floor Votes”, Congress &Presidency 30:123-139 (2003).

22. Douglas Roscoe, “Electoral Messages From the District:Explaining Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives, Congress &Presidency 30:37-55 (2003).

23. Gary Jacobson, “Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection”, Congress &Presidency 30:1-37 (2003).

24. Rebecca Deen and Laura Allen, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration”, 1989-1993), Congress & the Presidency, 29: 47-69 (2002).

C. Divided Government, and Legislative Productivity

1.George Edwards, et al., The Legislative Impact of Divided Government@, American Journal of Political Science 41: 545-564 (1997).

2. John Coleman, A Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, American Political Science Review 93: 821-837 (1999).

3. James Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era Of Coalition Government in The United States, Political Science Quarterly 103: 613-35 (1988).

4. Sean Kelley, Divided We Govern: A Reassessment, Polity 25:475-484(1993).

5.———–, Response: Let’s Stick With the Larger Question, Polity 25: 489-90(1993).

6. Sarah Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, American Political Science Review, 93: 519-535 (1999).

7. Gregory Thorson, A Divided Government and the Passage of Partisan Legislation, 1947-1990 A, Political Research Quarterly 51: 751-64 (1998).

8. ————and Tasina Nitzschke, “ Politics and Policy in the 103rd and 104th Congresses: Evaluating the Effects of Divided Government”, Congress & the Presidency” 27: 1-13 (2000).

9. Donald Eilenstine et al, A Trends and Cycles in the Legislative Productivity of the U.S. Congress, 1789-1976″, Quality and Quanity 12: 19-44 (1978).

10. William Howell, et al, “Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congess, 1945-94”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:285-313 (2000).

11. Andrew Taylor, Explaining Government Productivity, American
Politics Quarterly 26: 439-58 (1998).

12. Morris Fiorina, An Era of Divided Government, Political Science Quarterly 107: 387-411(1992).

13. Glen Krutz, AGetting Around Gridlock: The Effect of Omnibus Utilization on Legislative Productivity, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 533-551 (2000).

14. David Brady, The Causes and Consequences of Divided Government: Toward a New theory of American Politics?, American
Political Science Review 87:189-194 (1993).

15. Bryan Jones et al, Does Incrementalism Stem From Political Consensus or From Institutional Gridlock ?, American Journal of Political Science 41:1319-1339 (1997)

16. Thomas Gilligan, “ Performance of an Institutionalized Legislature”, Political Analysis 3:1-25 (1991)

IX. President, Congress and Administrative Process

A. Books

1. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation.

2. Larry Dodd and Richard Schott, Congress and the Administrative State, 2nd Edition.

3. Joel Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye.

4. Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy and the Myth of the Assertive Congress.

5. Gordon Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy

6. Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power.

7. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegated Power.

8. William West, Controlling the Bureaucracy: The Theory and Practice of
Institutional Constraints (M.E. Sharps, 1995).

9. Gary Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion, 1987.

10. Barry Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential Influence ( 1995).

11. Richard Waterman, Presidential Influence and the Administrative State (1989).

12. George Krause, The Two Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State (1999).

13. Mark Huddleston and William Boyer, The Higher Civil Service in the United States: The Quest for Reform (1996).

14. Patricia Inagraham and David Rosenbloom, The Promise and Paradox of Civil Service Reform (1993).

15. Thomas Weko, The Politicizing Presidency: The White House Personnel Office, 1948-1994 (1995).

16. William West, Administrative Rulemaking, Greenwood, 1985

17. Glen Robinson, American Bureaucracy: Public Choice and Public Law (1991).

18. Bernard Rosen, Holding Bureaucrats Accountable, 3rd Edition (1998).

19. Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (2000).

20. Marc Allen Eisner, Contemporary Regulatory Policy (2000).

21. Mark Rosell, Executive Privilege: The Dilemma of Secrecy and
Democratic Accountability (1994).

22. Adam Breckenridge, The Executive Privilege: Presidential Control Over
Information (1974).

23. Harold Relyea et al, President and Information Policy (1981).

24. Patricia Ingraham, The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in
American Democracy ( 1995).

25. David Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative Centered Public
Administration, Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-1999 (2000)
27. Phillip Cooper, By Order of the President.

28. Kenneth Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen

29. Colton Campbell et al, eds., Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy (note Chapter on executive agreements].

30. Paul E. Peterson, The President, The Congress and The Making of Policy.

31. Lee Hamilton, A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress

32. James Fesler and Don Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process

33.

34. R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (1994).

35. Jeremy Rosner, The New Tug of War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security

37. John Huber and Charles Shipan, Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy

38. Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics

39. Larry Berman, The Office of Management and Budget, 1921-1979,
Princeton, 1979

40. Shelley Tomkin, Inside OMB, M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

41. Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking, CQ Press, 1994

42. Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions, Basic Books, 1989

43. Barry Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The Eruption of
Presidential Influence (1995).
B. Articles: Rational Choice

1. Mathew McCubbins, et al., Structure and Process; Policy and Process: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, Virginia Law Review 75: 431-829(1989).

2. Mathew McCubbins, et al, “Administrative Procedure as Instruments of Political Control”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 243–279 (1987).

3. Terry Moe, An Assessment of the Theory of Congressional Dominance, Legislative Studies Quarterly 12: 475-520 (1987).

4. Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12: 119-67 (1996).

5. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committeee System, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13: 101-27 (1997).

6. Katherine Bawn, “Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures”, American Political Science Review 89:62-73 (1995).

6. John Huber and Charles Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies and Transaction Costs, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 25-33 (2000).

7. Hugo Hopenhayn and Susanne Lohmann, Fire Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12:196-214 (1996).

8. Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast, The American System of Separated Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB, Journal of Law . Economics, and Organization 16:269-306 (2000).

9. Terry Moe and William Howell, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 132-179 (1999).

10. McNollgast, “The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15:180-218 (1999).

11. Rui J. P.De Figueiredo Jr. et al, “An Informational Perspective on
Administrative Procedures”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15:283-305 (1999).

12. Sean Gailmard. 2002. “Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15:283-305 (1999).

13. Jeffrey Hill and James Brazier, “ Constraining Administrative Decisions: A critical Examination of the Structure and Process Doctrine”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7:373-401 (1991).

14. Jonathan Macey, “Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8: 93-111 (1992). See Comments.

15. Scott Basinger, “Regulating Slavery: Deck Stacking and Credible Commitment in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19: 307-343 (2003).

16. Elizabeth Martin, “ An Informational Theory of the Legislative Veto”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13:319-344(1997).

17. Bernard Steunenberg, “Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy Making, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8: 673-695 (1992).

18. Jon Bendor et al, Theories of Delegation, Annual Review of Political Science 4:235-69 (2001).

19.David Epstein and Sharon O’Halloran, “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion”, American Journal of Political Science 38: 697-722 (1994).

20. Steven Balla and John Wright, “ Interest Groups Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy”, American Journal of Political Science 45: 799-813 (2001).

21. John Ferejohn and Charles Shippan, Congressional Influence on the Bureaucracy”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:1-21sp (1990). Also Comments

22. Jerry Mashaw, “Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:267-299sp (1990). Also Comments

23. Pablo Spiller and John Ferejohn, “The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8:1-8 (1992).

24. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn, “ Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State”,
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8:165-241 (1992). (Also Comments).

25. Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, “Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10:96-126 (1994).

26. Phillip Huxtable, Incororating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn-Shipan Model”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10:160-68 (1994).

27. Craig Volden, “Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18:187-220 (2002).

28 Steven Balla, Legislative Organization and Congressional Review of Agency Rules, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16:424-449. (2000).

29.

B. Institutional and Behavioral

1. William West, Institutionalized Rationality in Regulatory Administration, Public Administration Review , July/August 1983

2. William West, “ The Politics of Administrative Rule Making”, Public
Administration Review, September/October 1982.

3. William West, Searching for a Theory of Bureaucratic Structure, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7:591-613 (1997).

4. William West, “Informal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Analysis”, Public Administration Review 64: 66-80 (Jan.-Feb., 2004).

5. Lyn Ragsdale and John Theis, III, The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, American Journal of Political Science 41:1280-1318 (1997).

6. Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, Journal of Politics 61:445-466 (1999).

7. John Scholz and B. Dan Wood, Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public Administration. American Journal of Political Science 42: 141-163 (1998).

6. Diana Evans, Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Members’ Goals”, Political Science Quarterly 109: 669-689 (Fall, 1994).

8. Jeffrey Cohen and George Krause, Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-1996, Journal of Politics 62:88-115 (2000)

9. David H. Rosenbaum, “Whose Bureaucracy Is This Anyway? Congress’1946 Answer”, PS 34773-779 (2001).

10. Karen Orren, and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime
Building in American Government”, Political Science Quarterly 113
(Winter 1998-1999): 689-702.

11. Morris Ogul and Bert Rockman,” Overseeing Oversight: New Departures andc Old Problems”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 15: 5-25 (1990).

12. Richard Waterman et al, “The Venues of Influence: A New Theory of Political Control of the Bureaucracy”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8: 13-38 (Jan., 1998).

13. Joel Aberbach, “What Happened to the Useful Eye”, Congress & the Presidency, 29: 3-25 (2002).

14. Thomas McGarrity, “The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking”, Law and
Contemporary Problems 54: 91ff (1991).

C. Foreign Policy

1. Louis Fisher and David Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, Political Science Quarterly 113: 1-21(1998).

2. Paul Peterson, “ The President’ Dominance in Foreign Policy Making”
Political ScienceQuarterly 109: 215-234 (1994)

3. Destler, Congress and Foreign Policy at Century’s End: Requiem on
Cooperation, in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 7th Edition,

4. Louis Fisher, Clinton’s Military Actions: No Rivals In Sight, in James
Thurber, ed., Rivals For Power: Presidential Congressional Relations, 2nd Edition, Ch 11.

5. Eileen Burgin, Congress and Foreign Policy: the Misperceptions, in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 5th Edition, Ch 14.

6. Lee Sigelman, A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies, Journal of Politics 41: 1195-1205

7. Steven A. Shull and Lance T. Leloup, Reassessing the Reassessment:
Comment on Sigelman’s Note on the “Two Presidencies’ Thesis”, Journal of
Politics 43: 563-564.

8. Louis Fisher, “ Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives”, Political
Science Quarterly 109: 739-763 (Winter 1994-95).

9. William M. LeoGrande, “Tug of War: How Real is the Rivalry between
Congress and President over Foreign Policy”, Congress &Presidency 29:113-
119 (2002).

10. James Scott and Ralph Carter, “Acting on the Hill: Congressional
Assertiveness in Foreign Policy”, Congress &Presidency 29:151-171 (2002).

11. Bryan Marshall and Brandon Prins, “ The Pendulum of Congressional
Power: Agend Change, Partisanship, and the Demise of the Post-World War II Foreign Policy Consensus”, Congress &Presidency 29:195-213 (2002).

12. Walt Vanderbush and Patrick Haney, “ Clinton, Congress, and Cuba Policy Between Two Codifications: The Changing Executive-Legislative
Relationship in Foreign Policy Making”, Congress &Presidency 29:171-195 (2002).

13. Karl Schonberg, “ Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering the War Power after September 11”, Political Science Quarterly, 119:115-143. (2004)

X. President, Congress, and Courts

A. Books

1. Colton Campbell and John Stack, eds., Congress Confronts the Courts.

2. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and President

3. Daniel Farber and Phillip Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction (Courts).

4. Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians: Judicial Control of Administration (1988).

5. R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of Clean Air (1983).
B. Articles and Papers

1.Cornell Clayton, “Separate Branches-Separate Politics: Judicial Enforcement of Congressional Intent”, Political Science Quarterly 109: 843-873 (Winter 1994-95).

2. James Meernik and Joseph Ignagni, “Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the Constitution”, American Journal of Political Science 41:447-468 (1997).

3. Emerson Tiller, “Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making”, Journal of Law, Economics, &Organization 14:114-136 (1998).

4. Clifford Caruba and James R. Rogers, “National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause”, Journal of Law, Economics, &Organization 19:543-571 (2003).

5. Timothy Conlan et al, “ The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism”, Political Science Quarterly 116:253-277(2001).

6. Martha Anne Humphries and Donald Songer, “Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies”, Journal of Politics 61: 207-221 (1999).

7. Cynthia Farina, “Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State”, Columbia Law Review 89:452-528 (1989).

8. Brandice Canes –Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts, American Journal of Political Science 47:205-215 (2003).

9. Martin Shapiro, “ APA: Past, Present., and Future”, Virginia Law Review 72: around 451-457 (1986).

10. Martin Shapiro, “ Administrative Decision Making: The Next Stage”, Yale Law Review 92: 1487-1522 (1983).

11. Martin Shapiro, “Judicial Activism”, in Seymour M. Lipset ed., The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society” (1979).

12. Bruce Ackerman and Andrew Hassler, Beyond the New Deal (Chapter One), Clean Coal /Dirty Air (1981).

13. R. Shep Melnick, The Courts, Congress, and Programmatic Rights”, in Richard Hariss and Sidney Melnick, eds., Remaking American Politics (1989).

14. Roberta Romano, “Comment on Judicial Choice and Legal Doctrine”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8: 47-58 (1992).

15. Daniel Farber, “Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8:59-89 (1992). (Also Comment).

16. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, American Political Science Review 96:511-525 ( 2002).

XI. Electoral Linkages: Past and Present

A. Books

I. David Mayhew, The Electoral Connection.

2. Richard Fenno, Home Style (See also APSR 71:883-918, September, !977).

3. Gary Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 4th Edition.

4.———————, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government:
Competition in U.S. House Elections.

5. Linda Fowler, Candidates, Congress, and the American
Democracy.

6. Paul Gronke, The Electorate, Campain, and the Election: A Unified Theory of
House and Senate Elections

7. David Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making. (See also APSR 79: 28-49, 1985).

8. Paul Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington, 2nd Edition.

9. John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981.

10. Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington
Establishment, 2nd Edition.

11. David Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Poitical Amateurs in the U. S. Congress. (See also APSR 37:1119-41 (1993).

12. Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais, The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States.

13. Robert Biersack, et al.,eds., After the Revolution: Pac’s and Lobbies in the New Republican Congress.

14. Mark Rosell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Campaigning.

15. Burdette Loomis, The New American Politician.

16. David Magleby, Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections.

17. Robert Goidel, et al, Money Matters: Consequences of Financial Campaign Reform in House Elections

18. Paul Kleppner, Who Voted: Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870 1980.

19.———————-, Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893- 1928.

20.———————-, The Third Election System: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures.

21. David Brady, et al, eds., Continuity and Change in House Elections.

22. James Campbell, Cheap Seats: The Democratic Party’s Advantage in U.S. House Elections.

23.————————, The Presidential Pulse of House Elections.

24. Gary Selnow, High Tech Campaigns: Computer Technology in Campaign Communication.

25. James Thurber and Candice Nelson,eds., Campaigns and
Elections American Style.

26. Kathleen Hall Jameson, Everything You Think You Know About Politics—- and Why You Are Wrong

27. W. Lance Bennet, Government Crisis: Media, Money and
Marketing in American Elections

28. Robert Dinkin, Campaigning in Americva: A History of Election Practices (1989).

29. Frank Luntz, Candidates, Consultants, and Campaigns (1988).

30. James Thurber, ed., The Battle for Congress (2001).

31.———————- and Candice Nelson, eds., Campaign Warriors: Political
Consultants in Elections (2000).

32. ——————–et al, eds. Crowded Airways: Campaign Advertizing in Elections (2000).

33. Andrew Busch, Horses in Midstream: U.S. Midterm Elections and Their Consequences, 1894-1998 (1999).

34. Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution

35. Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of the Central State, 1859-77

36.——————–. Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900.

37.———————, The American Ballot Box in Mid-Nineteeth Century America.

38.———————, Sectionalism and American Political development, 1880-1980.
B. Articles and Papers

1. Gary King and Andrew Gelman, Measuring Incumbency Without Bias, American Journal of Political Science 34:1142-64 (1990).

2.————–, Systematic Consequences of Incumbency Advantage, in American Journal Of Political Science 35:110-39 (1991).

3. Michael Krashinsky and William Milne, The Effects of Incumbency in U. S. Congressional Elections, 1950-1988, Legislative Studies Quarterly 18: 321-344 (1993).

4. Douglas Rivers and Morris Fiorina, Constituency Service, Reputation, and the Incumbency Advantage@, in Morris Fiorina and David Rohde, eds., Homestyle and Washington Work, pp.17-47 (1989).

5. Joseph Cooper, et al., The Electoral Basis of Party Voting, in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., The Impact of theElectoral Process, pp. 135-167 (1977).

6. Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz, Why Did The Incumbency Advantage
in U.S. House Elections Grow?, American Journal of Political Science 40:
478 497 (1996).

7. Robert Goidel and Todd Shields, The Vanishing Marginals, the Bandwagon, and the Mass Media, Journal of Politics 56: 802-810 (1994).

8. Jonathan Katz and Brian Sala, Careerism, Commitee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection, American Political Science Review, 90: 21-34 (1996).

9. L. Sandy Maisel, Quality Candidates in House and Senate Elections, from 1982-1990, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peters, eds., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation of Congressional Change.

10. David Brady and Kara Buckley, Coalitions and Policy in the U.S. Congress: Lessons from the 103rd and 104th Congresses”, in L.
Sandy Maisel,ed., The Parties Respond, 3rd Edition.

11. Richard Herrera and Michael Yawn, The Emergence of the Personal Vote, Journal of Politics 61: 137-150 (1999).

12. John Gilmour and Paul Rothstein, A Dynamic Model of Loss, Retirement, and Tenure in the U.S. House, Journal of Politics 58: 54- 69 (1996).

13. Lawrence Jacobs et al, Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion, Political Science Quarterly 113: 21-43 (1998).

14. Kenneth Bickers and Robert Stein, The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era, Journal of Politics 62:1070-1087 (2000).

15. John Alford and John Hibbing, Electoral Convergence in the U.S. Congress. In Bruce Oppenheimer, ed., Senate Exceptionalism, pp.89-109 (2002).

16. Patrick Sellers, Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns, American Political Science Review 92: 159-173 (1998).

17.Alan Gerber, Estimating the Effects of Campaign Spending on Senate Elections, American Political Science Review 92: 401-413 (1998).

18. Stephen Levitt and Catherine Wolfram, Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage, Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:45-61 (2000).

19. Steven Livingston and Sally Friedman, Reexamining Theories of Congressional Retirement: Evidence from the 1980’s, Legislative Studies Quarterly 18: 231-255 (1993).

20. Michael Bailey and David Brady, Heterogeneity and Representation: the Senate and Free Trade, American Journal of Political Science 42:524-545 (1998).

21. John Coleman and Paul Manna, Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy, Journal of Politics 62: 757-790 (2000).

22, Lawrence Rothenberg and Mitchell Sanders, Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress. American Journal of Political Science 44:316-326 (2000).

23. Frances Lee, A Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Disributive Politics, American Political Science Review 94:59-73 (2000).

24. Walter Mebane, Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections, American Political Science Review 94:37-59 (2000).

25. James Kuklinsky and Gary Segura, Endogeneity, Exogeneity, Time, and Space in Political Representation, Legislative Studies Quarterly 20: 3-23 (1995).

26. Richard Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, Legislative Studies Quarterly 20: 89-141 (1995).

27. Bernard Grofman et al, A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The comparative Midpoints Model, Journal of Politics 62:34-51 (2000).

28. Christopher Mooney and Mei-Hsien Lee, The Influence of Values on Consensus and the Contentious Morality Policy: U.S. Death Penalty Reform, 1956-1982, Journal of Politics 62:223-240 (2000).

29. David Austin Smith, Campaign Contributuons and Access, American Political Science Review 89: 566-582 (1995).

30. Jeffrey Stonecash and Mack Mariani, Republican Gains in the House in the 1994 Elections: Class Polarization in American Politics, Political Science Quarterly 115: 93-115(2000).

31. Gary Jacobson, A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000, Political Science Quarterly 116: 5-29(2001).

32. Robert Erikson, The 2000 Presidential Election in Historical Perspective, Political Science Quarterly 116: 29-52(2001).

33. Gary C. Jacobson, “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments, American Journal of Political Science 34:334-363 (1990). See also Greene and Krasno Rebuttal, Ibid, pp. 363-373.

34. William Jacoby, “Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes”,
American Journal of Political Science 35:178-206 (1991).

35. Marc Hetherington, “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of
Elite Polarization”, American Political Science Review 95:619-633 (2001).

36. Ricard Landeau and Michael Lewis-Beck, “National Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections”, Journal of Politics 63:159-182 (2001).

37. Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Suzanna De Boef, “Macropartisanship and Macroideology in the Sophisticated Electorate”, Journal of Politics 63:232-249 (2001).

38. Stephen Ansolabehere et al, Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage”, American Journal of Political Science 44:17-34 (2000).

39. Larry Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996”, American Journal of Political Science 44: 35-50 (2000).

40. Todd Shields et al, “Participation Rates, Socioeconomic Class Biases, and Elections: A Crossvalidation”, American Journal of Political Science 41:683-691 (1997).

41. William Jacoby, “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending”, American Journal of Political Science 44:750-768 (2000).

42. Frank Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics”, Journal of Politics 63: 1191-1214 (2001).

43. Patrick Sellers, “”Fiscal Consistency and Federal District Spendingin Congressional Elections”, American Journal of Political Science 41:10241042 (1997).

44. E. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, “Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristic Approach”, American Journal of Political Science 41:885-919 (1997).

45. Hurley Patricia and Kim Hill. 2003.”Beyond the Demand Output-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages”, Journal of Politics 65:304-327 (2003).

46. Robert Huckfeldt et al, “The Dynamics of Collective Deliberation in the 1996 Election”, American Political Science Review 94:641-652 (2000).

47. Gary Jacobson, “Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections”, Political Science Quarterly 118:1-23(2003).

48. James Kuklinski, Representative-Constituency Linkages: A Review Article, Legislative Studies Quarterly 4: 121-141 (1979).

49. Michael Bailey and David Brady, “Heterogeneity and
Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”, American Journal of
Political Science 42:524-545 (1998).

50. Alan Gerber and Donald Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Turnout”, American Political Science Review 94:652-663 (2000).

51. Jeffrey Jenkins et al, Constituency Cleavages and Congressional Parties, 1857-1913, Social Science History 28:537-573, Winter, 2004.

XII. Institutional Development

A. Books

1. Joseph Cooper, The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.

2. ————-, Congress and Its Committees.

3. Ronald Peters, The American Speakership, 2nd Edition.

4. James Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress.

5. Sarah Binder, Majority Rule/ Minority Rights. See also APSR 90: 8-21 (1996).

6. —————–and Steven Smith, Politics or Principal: Filibustering in the Senate.

7. Elaine Swift, The Making of an American Senate.

8. Roger Davidson, et al, eds., Masters of the House.

9. Richard Baker and Roger Davidson, First Among Equals: Outstanding Senate Leaders in the Twentieth Century.

10. David Rothman, Power in the Senate.

11. Margaret Thompson, The Spider Web: Congress and Lobbying in the Age of Grant.

12. Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress.

13. James Sterling Young, The Washington Community:1800- 1828.

!4. Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism.

15. John Hibbing, Congressional Careers, Contours of Life in the House of Representatives (1991).

16. John Hoadley, Origins Of American Political Parties, 1789-1803. (See also APSR 74:757-779 (1980).

17. Nobel Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801-1809.

18. —————————, The Process of Government Under Jefferson.

19. Scott James, Presidents, Parties, and the State.

20. Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Authority.

21. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress.

22. Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew

23. Nelson Polsby, How Congress Evolve

24. Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls, The Invention of the United States Senate,
2004.
B. Articles and Papers

1. Nelson Polsby, The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives, American Political Science Review 62:144-168 (1968).

2. Kenneth Shepsle, Congressional Institutions and Behavior: The Changing Textbook Congress, in John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds., American Political Institutions and Problems of Our Time (1989).

3. Joseph Cooper and David Brady, Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress, American Political Science Review 75:988-1006 (1981).

4. ———— and Cheryl Young, Bill Introduction in the Nineteenth Century, Legislative Studies Quarterly 13: 67-105 (1989)

5. ————-and Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyzing Institutional Change: Bill Introduction in the 19th Century Senate. In Bruce Oppenheimer, ed., U.S. Senate Exceptionalism (2002)

6. John Gilmour and Paul Rothstein, A Dynamic Model of Loss, Retirement, and Tenure in the House of Representatives, The Journal of Politics 58: 54-68 (1996).

7. Charles Stewart, The Growth of the Committee System, from Randall to Gillette, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peter eds., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation of Congressional Change.

8. Randall Strahan, Reed and Rostenkowski: Congressional Leadership in Institutional Time, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peters, eds., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation of Congressional Change.

9. James Campbell, Congressional Elections, 1868-1988, in Allen Hertzke and Ronald Peters, eds., The Atomistic Congress: An Interpretation of Congressional Change.

10. Morris Fiorina, et al, Historical Change in House Turnover, in
Norman Ornstein, ed., Congress In Change (1975).

11. Samuel Kernell, Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation, American Journal of Political Science 21: 669-93 (1977).

12. Peter Swenson, The Influence of Recruitment on the Structure of Power In the U.S. House,1870-1940, Legislative Studies Quarterly 7:7-36 (1982).

13. Margaret Munk, Origin and Development of the Party Floor Leadership in the
United States Senate, Capitol Studies 2: 23-41 (1974).

14. Douglas Price, Careers and Committees in the American Congress, in William Aydelotte, ed., The History of Parliamentary Behavior , pp. 28-62 (1977).

15. William Bianco, et al, The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816″, American Journal of Political Science 40:145-171(1996).

16. Samuel Kernell and Michael McDonald, Congress and America Political Development: The Transformation of the Post Office from Patronage to Service, American Journal of Political Science 43: 792- 812 (1999).

17. Sarah Crook and John Hibbing, A Not-So-Distant Mirror: the 17th Amendment and Congressional Change, American Political Science Review 91: 845-854 (1997).

18. David Brady and Mark Morgan, Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process: The Effects of the 1885 and 1919-20 Reforms, in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy (1987).

19. David Brady, et al, Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The
United States Senate, 1880-1920, Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:205-23 (1989).

20. David Brady and David Epstein, Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Senate: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate,1890-1920, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13:26-50 (1997).

21. Jeffrey Jenkins, Property Rights and the Emergence of Standing Committee Dominance in the 19th Century House, Legislative Studies Quarterly 23:493-521 (1998).

22. ——————- and Timothy Nokken, The Institutional Origins of the Republican Party: Spatial Voting and the House Speakership Election of 1855-56, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 101-131 (2000).

23. Allen Bogue and Mark P. Marlaire, Of Mess and Men:The Boardinghouse and Congressional Voting, American Journal of Political Science 19: 207-229 (1975).

24. William Bianco et al, The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of The Compensation Act of 1816. American Journal of Political Science 40: 145-171 (1996).

25. Evelyn Fink, Representation by Deliberation: Change in the Rules of Deliberation in the U.S. House of Representatives,1789-1841, Journal of Politics 62:1109-1126 (2000).

26. David Canon and David Sousa, Party System Change and Political Career Structures in the U.S. Congress, Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 347-365 (1992).

27. Eric Schickler and John Sides, Inergenerational Warfare: The Senate Decentralizes Appropriations, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 551-577 (2000).

28. Jerome Clubb and Sandra Traugott, Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7:375-402 (1977).

29. ———————– and Brian Sala, The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824, American Journal of Political Science 42:1157-1180 (1998).

30. Eric Schickler, 2000. Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998. American Political Science Review 94: 269-289.

31. John J., Coleman, States Formation and the Decline of Political Parties,
Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall 1994): 195-230

32. Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek, Regimes and Regime Building in
American Government, Political Science Quarterly113(Winter 1998-1999):689-702

33. Andrew Polsky, “Why Regimes”, Polity 29:625-640 (1997).

34. Sean Theriault, “Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People”, Journal of Politics 65:50-69 (2003)

35. Thomas Cavanaugh, “The Dispersion of Authority in the House Of
Representatives”, Political Science Quarterly 97 (Winter 1982-83): 623-37.

XIII. Congressional Reform

A. Books

1. Burton Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform.

2. C. Lawrence Evans and Walter Oleszek, Congress Under Fire: Reform Politics and the Republican Majority.

3. Joseph Cooper and C. Calvin MacKenzie, The House at Work.

4. Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek, Congress Against Itself
5. C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment.

6. Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress (1994).

7. Gerald Benjamin and Michael Malbin, eds., Limiting Congressional Terms.

8. Kenneth Mayer and David Cannon, The Dysfunctional Congress; The Individual Roots of a Collective Dilemma.

9. Roger Davidson, et al, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform.

10. James Thurber and Roger Davidson, eds, Remaking Congress: Change and Stability in the 1990’s.

11. E. Scott Adler, Why Congressional Reforms Fail.
B. Articles and Papers

1. Roger Davidson, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the Advent of the Modern Congress, Legislative Studies Quarterly 15: 357-73 (1990).

2. Sara Crook and John Hibbing, ?A Not-So-Distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Congressional Change@, American Political Science Review 91:845-853(1997).

3. John R. Wright, Interest Groups, Congressional Reform, and Party Government in the United States, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 217-237 (2000).

XIV. National Politics, the Media, and Public Trust

A. Books

1. Timothy Cook, Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House of Representatives.

2.————, Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution.

3. Stephen Hess, Live from Capitol Hill! Studies of Congress and the Media.

4. Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, latest edition.
5. Lance Bennett, News:The Politics of Illusion.

6. Karen Kedrowski, Media Entrepreneurs and the Media Enterprise in the United States Congress.

7. Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy.

8.

9. Shanto Iyengar and Richard Reeves, eds., Do the Media Govern? Politicians, Voters, and Reporters in America.

10. Dan Nimmo and David Swanson, eds., New Directions in Political Communication.

11. Matthew Kerbel, Remote and Controlled: Media Politics in a Cynical Age, 2nd Edition.

12. Eric Uslaner, The Decline of Comity in Congress

13. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theis-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy

14. William Bianco, Trust:Representatives and Constituents

15. Craig Stephen C. The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America.

16. Joseph S, Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, eds., Why People Don’t Trust Government, eds.

17. Stephen C. Craig, ed., Broken Contract?: Changing Relationships Between Americans and Their Government.

18. Samuel P. Huntington , American Politics and the Promise of Democracy.

19. Joseph Cooper, ed., Congress and the Decline of Public Trust.

20. Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason.

21. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds., Trust and Governance.

22. Mark Warren, ed., Democracy and Trust.

23. Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Persuasion and
Communication in Presidential Campaigns.

24. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theis-Morse, What is it About Government
Americans Dislike

B. Articles and Papers

1. Karlyn Bowman and Everett C. Ladd. Public Opinion toward Congress: A Historical Look, in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., Congress, the Public, and the Press (1994).

2. Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, Explaining Congressional Approval. American Journal of Political Science 41:175-208 (1997).

3. Ladd Everett C., Public Opinion and the “Congress Problem”.The Public Interest 100: 57-68 (1990).

4. David C. Kimball and Samuel C. Patterson. 1997. Living Up to Expectations: Public Attitudes Toward Congress. The Journal of Politics 59:701-729 (1997).

5. Dodd Lawrence C. 1993. Congress and the Politics of Renewal: Redressing the Crisis of Legitimation , in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered (1993).

6. Douglas Harris, The Rise of the Public Speakership, Political Science Quarterly 113:193-212 (1998).

7. Marc Heatherington, The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-96, American Political Science Review 93: 311-327 (1999).

8. Matthew Mendelsohn, The Media and Interpersonal Communications: The Priming of Issues, Leaders, and Party Identification, Journal of Politics 58: 112-125 (1996).

9. John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, Individual- Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital, American Journal of Political Science 41:999-1024 (1997).

10. Robert Jackman and Ross Miller, Renaissance of Political Culture, American Journal of Political Science 40:632-659 (1996).

11.——————————————, A The Poverty of Political Culture, American Journal of Political Science 40:697-716 (1996).

12. Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, A Comparing European Publics, American Political Science Review 92: 185-190 (1998).

13. Christopher Anderson and Christine Guillory, A Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems, American Political Science Review 91:66-82 (1997).

14. James Schmidt, Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies, American Political Science Review
92: 419-427 (1998).

15. Dhavan Shah, et al, News Coverage, Economic Cues, and the Public’s Presidential Preferences, 1984-1996″, Journal of Politics 61:914-944 (1999).

16. Richard Waterman, et al, The Expectations Gap Thesis: Public Attitudes Toward an Incumbent President, Journal of Politics 61:944-967 (1999).

17. Thomas Nelson and Zoe Oxlley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion, Journal of Politics 61:1040-1068 (1999).

18. Dena Levy and Peverill Squire, Television Markets and the Competitiveness of U.S. House Elections, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 313-327 (2000).

12. Theda Skocpol et al, A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States, American Political Science Review 94:527-547 (2000).

20. John Scholz and Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, American Journal of Political Science 42:398-418 (1998).

21. Ken Goldstein and Paul Freedman, New Evidence for Old Arguments: Money and Advertizing in the 1996 Senate Elections, Journal of Politics 62:1087-1109 (2000).

22. James Kuklinski et al, A Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship, Journal of Politics 62:790-817 (2000).

23. Joanne Miller and Jon Kosnick, News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Knowledgeable Citizens are guided by a Trusted Source. American Journal of Political 44:301-316 (2000).

24. Forum on Negative Advertizing and Campaigns, American Political Science Review 93:851-911 (1999).

25. Richard Lau and Gerald Pomper, Effects of Negative Advertizing on Turnout in U.S. Senate Elections, 1988-1998″, Journal of Politics 63:804-820 (2001).

26. Robert Dahl, A Democratic Paradox, Political Science Quarterly 115: 35- 41(2000).

27. Gerald Mara, Thucydides and Plato on Democracy and Trust, Journal of Politics 63: 820-845 (2001)

28. Christopher Anderson and Andrew LoTempio, Winning, Losing, and Political Trust, British Journal of Political Science 32:335-351 (2002).

29. Katherine McGraw et al, “The Pandering Politicians of Suspicious Minds”, Journal of Politics 64:362-384 (2002).

30. Mitchell Seligson, “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy”, Journal of Politics 64: 408-434 (2002).

31. Regina Lawrence and W. Lance Bennett, “Rethinking Media Politics and Public Opinion: Reactions to the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal”. Political Science Quarterly 116:425-477 (2001).

32. Michael Traugott et al, “Civic Engagement in the Post-9/11 World”,
PS 35:511-517(2002).

33. Brian Gains, “Where’s the Rally: Approval and Trust in President and Congress and Government Since 9/11” PS 35:531-537(2002).

34. Jonathan Krasno and Kenneth Goldstein, “The Facts about Television Advertising and the McCain-Feingold Bill”, PS 35:207-216(2002).

35. Lee Sigelman and Mark Kruger, “ Why is Research on the Effects of Reseaerch Negative Campaigning so Inconclusive”, Journal of Politics 65:142-161 (2003).

36. James Druckman, The Power of TV Images: The First Kennedy_Nixon Debate” Journal of Politics 65: 532-559 (May, 2003).

37. Lee Sigelman and Emmett Buell, “You Take the High Road and I’ll Take the Low Road: The Interplay of Attack Strategies and Tactics in
Presidential Campaigns”, Journal of Politics 65: 518-532 (May, 2003).

38. Samuel Patterson and Gregory Caldeira, “Standing Up for Congress: Variations in Public Esteem”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 15:25-49 (1990).

39. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theis-Morse, “ Process Preferences and American Politics”, American Political Science Review 95:145-155 (2001).

XV. Parliamentary Government

A. Books

1. Shaun Bowler et al, eds., Party Discipline and Parliamentary
Government.

2. Gary Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Efficient Parties in Victorian England.

3. Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain.

B. Articles

1. Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival. American Journal of Political Science 42: 28-58 (1998).

2.Daniel Diermeier and Randolph Stevenson, Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events. American Political Science Review 94: 627-641 (2000).

3. Charles Tilly, The Parliamentarization of Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 in CharlesTilly, ed., Roads to the Future.

4. David Denemark, Partisan Pork Barrel In Parliamentary Regimes: Australian Consituency-Level Grants. Journal of Politics 62:896:916 (2000).

5. Kaare Strom, Institutions and Strategy in Parliamentary Democracy: A Review Article, Legislative Studies Quarterly 23: 127-145 (1998).

6. ——————, A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. American Journal of Political Science 34: 565-598 (1990).

7. Carol Mershon, The Costs of Coalitions: Coalition Theories and Italian Government. American Political Science Review 90: 534-555 (1996).

8. Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom, Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections, American Political Science Review 89:648-669 (1995).

9. Thomas Remington and Steven Smith, Theories of Legislative Institutions and the Organization of the Russian Duma, American Journal of Political Science 42: 545-572 (1998).

10. John Carey et al, Legislative Autonomy in New Regimes, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24: 569-605 (1999).

11. Gary Cox et al, “Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions, and Party Structure: Conservative Factions in Japan’s Upper and Lower Houses”, American Journal of Political Science 44:115-123 (2000).

12. Steven Finkel and Edward Muller, “ Rational Choice and the Dynamics of Collective Political Action: Evaluating Alternative Models with Panel Data”, American Political Science Review 92:37-51 (1998). (Trust)

13.Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehard, “Comparing European Politics”, American Political Science Review 92:185-191 (1998). (Trust)

14. George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis, American Political Science Review 93: 591-609(1999).

15. John Huber, “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies”, American Political Science Review 90: 269-283(1996).

16. Kaare Strom and Stephen Swindle, Strategic Parliamentary
Dissolution”, American Political Science Review 96:575-593 (2002).

17. Georg Vanberg, Legislative_Judicial Relations: A Game Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review”, American Journal of Political Science 45:346-362 (2001).

XVI. Federalism and State Legislatures

A. Books

1. Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic

B. Articles

1. Alan Rosenthal, “State Legislative Development: Obsevations from
Three Perspectives”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 21: 169-199 (1996).

2. John Pelissero and Timothy Krebs, “ City Council Committees and Policy
Making in Large U.S. Cities, American Journal of Political Science 41: 499-519 (1997).

3. James Gimpel, National Elections and the Autonomy of the American
State Party Systems (1996).

4. Michael Berkman, The State Roots of National Politics: Congress and
the Tax Agenda, 1978-1986 (1994).

5. Caroline Tolbert,” Direct Democracy and Institutional realignment in the American States” , Political Science Quarterly 118: 467-491(2003).

6. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, “Self-Enforcing Federalism”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21: 103-136 (2005).

XVII. Measurement Strategies and Issues

A. Books

I. Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.

B. Articles

1. James Snyder, Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17: 319-347 (1992).

2. Glen Platt, et al, Directional and Euclidean Theories of Voting Behavior: A Legislative Comparison, Legislative Studies Quarterly 17:561-573 (1992).

3. Keith Krehbiel, Deference, Extremism, and Interest Group Ratings, Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 61`-79 (1994).

4. Kim Hill et al, The Liberal Conservative Ideology of U.S. Senators: A New Measure@, American Journal of Political Science 41:1395-1413 (1997).

5. Stuart Elaine Macdonald et al, Sophistry versus Science: On Further efforts to Rehibilitate the Proximity Model, Journal of Politics 63: 482-501(2001).

6. Anders Westholm, On the Return of Epicycles: Some Crossroads in Spatial Modeling Revisited,Journal of Politics 63: 436-482 (2001).

7. Barry Burden, et al, Measuring the Ideologies of U.S. Senators: The Song Remains the Same, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 237-259 (2000).

8. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal, “ Measuring Issue Salience”, American
Journal of Political Science 44:66-84 (2000).

9. John Huber and Matthew Gabel, “Putting Parties in Their Place:
Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data”, American Journal of Political Science 44: 94-104 (2000).

10. Barry Burden. A Deterministic and Probabalistic Voting Models@,
American Journal of Political Science 41:1150-70 (1997).

11. Michael Bailey and Kelly Chang, Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstituional Preference Estimation”, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 17:477-507 (2001).

12. James M. Snyder and Tim Groseclose, “Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting, Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success, American Journal of Political Science 44: 193-211 (2000).

13. James M. Snyder and Tim Groseclose, “Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting, Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success, American Political Science Review 95:689-699 (2001).

14. Robert Adcock and David Collier, A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research, , American Political Science Review 95:529-547 (2001).

15. Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al, “ A New Approacxh to For Testing Budgetary
Incrementalism”, Journal of Politics 65: 532-559 (May, 2003).